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Abstract  
 
This paper considers the political activity of economic actors in what we 
refer to as ‘overlap issues.’ Such issues consist of two separate, but related, 
domestic and supranational decisions that are taken at both levels of 
European governance. Examined here are the domestic level privatisation 
policy-making processes in Spain, France and Ireland, and the subsequent 
European Commission decisions on the state aids given during the sales. 
The research argues that although the influence of economic actors is 
crucial in understanding the domestic-level privatisation aid negotiations, 
such actors’ participation is absent in the supranational decision-making 
process that witnessed all the aids being approved. In order to explain this 
limited political activity of firms at the EU-level, attention is focused on both 
the role of the member state and the paradoxes in EU policies that 
simultaneously guide and constrain the Commission from making a decision 
against capital. The conclusions situate our findings within the ‘elite 
pluralist’ literature on economic actors’ political activity in Europe while 
also considering the idea of the structural dependence of the EU on capital.   
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Introduction and Objectives 
Since the early 1990s, students of west European politics have paid increasing attention 
to the role of interest groups in the European Union (EU), guided by concepts of pluralism, 
corporatism or elitism that scholars raised in the larger comparative politics literature. Influenced 
by Dahl,ii authors including Mazey and Richardsoniii made significant insights into how non-state 
actors have sought to influence EU integration. While they argued that individuals and groups 
attempt to influence EU policy-making, they did not fully elaborate either constraints faced by 
some actors, or avenues through which others gained advantages. Greenwood et al. iv offered an 
alternative model by alluding to a mixed corporatist/pluralist system to explain EU public policy 
development. Clearly guided by the larger corporatist literature, as seen in Schmitter and 
Lembruch’s work, v  it was contended that specific interests who enjoy a monopoly of 
representation have fixed positions in policy-making. Later works transcended these 
‘transpluralist’ and ‘corporatist’ models and pointed instead to an “elite pluralist arrangement 
between institutions and policy actors.”vi Intuitively based on ideas raised by those including 
Lindblom,vii ‘elite plural’ analyses suggest that economic actors demanded a privileged EU 
policy-making position given increased regulatory competences from the state-level to 
Brussels. viii  In turn, these demands were “met with concomitant supply of access to the 
policy-process by political actors in EU institutions” seeking policy expertise.ix  
The ‘elite plural’ literature on the political activity of economic actors has pointed to the 
multi-level or dual lobbying strategies at both member state and EU levels. While earlier works 
by Mazey and Richardson and Greenwood recognized that ‘issues make politics and determine 
focus,’ Coen’s more detailed analysis of developments in trade, social, fiscal, technical and 
environmental issues was the first to clearly demonstrate that “firms play a complex multi-level 
game when seeking to influence the (European) policy process.”x On the one hand, where the EU 
has direct competency economic actors will seek either to directly lobby Brussels or to influence 
member states’ behaviour in the Council of Ministers.xi On the other, one should also “expect to 
see periods of national lobbying to facilitate the implementation of EU directives and raise new 
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industrial agendas at the Council of Ministers.”xii In a similar vein, examining vehicle pollution, 
common transport and single-market policies Young and Wallace present an advocacy alliance 
argument focussing on the actions of member state governments, supranational institutions and 
specific interests. xiii  Similar to Coen, they conclude that different economic actors play at 
different levels and different institutions depending on the issue and the country of origin. 
While these studies offer a cogent understanding of the role of economic actors in the 
European policy-making processes, one may argue that further insight on firm lobbying activity 
at both levels may be gained by extending the analysis to what we define as ‘overlap issues’ found 
in European governance. These are issues where two separate, but related, domestic and 
supranational decisions must be taken because they fall within each level’s jurisdiction. Such 
issues, in which an economic actor has a direct vested interest, can be found when coupling 
certain domestic level initiatives with supranational ones particularly falling within the 
‘competition’ rubric. They include, for example, the privatisation of a state company receiving 
subsidies (domestic level initiative) which have to be approved by Directorate General IV of the 
Commission (supranational level one); mergers which may be approved by national regulatory 
authorities before final adjudication by the Merger Task Force; or, a restrictive practices case in 
which a national regulator’s decision is potentially overturned by Brussels.  
From a theoretical vantage, ‘overlap issues’ may offer a somewhat different dynamic to 
areas studied by scholars such as Coen and Young and Wallace. This is because the issues they 
examine do not necessarily encapsulate two separate formal decisions that affect the firm, or, in 
other words, related decisions that must be made first at the domestic level and then at the 
supranational one. As above, these authors suggest that an economic actor’s potential lobbying 
activity follows a complex path dependent on the policy area. We can think of Coen’s as well as 
Young and Wallace’s scenario metaphorically as follows: the force of economic actors to 
influence decisions could be of differing strengths and could take several directions given that 
issue domains determine EU or national focus. This action could be visualised as economic actors 
taking multiple vectors, each with potentially different directions, to influence policy. Their 
scenario’s subsequent vector field (a region of space under potential influence) is dynamically 
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situated somewhere between (or, even at the poles of) both levels of European governance 
depending on the issue. However, in ‘overlap issues’ examined in this paper there is only a single, 
uni-directional vector to influence policy that may be taken by economic actors, where the vector 
stems from the domestic-level and extends to the European one. There is less complexity in 
overlap issues precisely because the decisions affecting the firm must, in principle, occur at the 
domestic level and, then, the supranational one. This suggests that the vector field is initially 
confined to the first level and then extends to the second level of European governance. 
Examination of actions taken by firms in such ‘overlap’ issues may thus help us better understand 
their political activity (or lack thereof) in both levels, allowing for verification or falsification of 
existing arguments in the literature. For example, in ‘overlap’ issues will economic actors attempt 
to influence both levels of EU governance? Do they opt for only one, potentially using this level 
to influence the other? Or, do they abstain from political activity altogether and still achieve 
policy outcomes that serve their interest? 
Seeking to better understand the political activity of economic actors, this paper examines 
the (dual) policy-processes of privatisations that received aids in Spain, France and Ireland since 
1986 and the subsequent EU-level decisions on the aids. The justification for analysis of 
privatisations and state aid is based on the above idea of the existence of ‘overlap,’ which offers 
the opportunity to examine the political activity of firms on decisions that are in principle made at 
both levels of governance. At the domestic level, economic actors purchasing companies may 
have influenced aid negotiations for their future investments. At the supranational one, economic 
actors may have also driven the decision-making process when such aids had to be approved by 
the European Commission. Certainly, one finds the argument in the literature that privatisation is 
a national issue: authors such as Majonexiv and Thatcherxv have argued that the Commission has 
followed a policy of subsidiarity in the regulation and privatisation process and that Article 222 of 
the EC Treaty remains neutral with regard to private versus public ownership. However, another 
argument in the literature offered by Wright xvi  and Moran and Prosser xvii  suggests that 
privatisations receiving aids are not an issue confined to the domestic level. Through Articles 
3(g), 87 (ex.92), and 88 (ex.93) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as well as the 
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Transparency Directives of 1980/1993, the Commission is legally armed to investigate and 
prohibit market-distorting aid.xviii  Therefore, states giving aids during privatisations can be 
constrained or even stopped by the Commission. Evidence of this is seen in the sale of the British 
Rover Group to British Aerospace in the early 1990s when the Commission heavily scrutinized 
aid.xix The apparent tough stance on aids, particularly since the SEA (1986) and Commissioner 
van Miert’s leadership of the Competition Directorate, was based on producer and consumer 
concerns. From a producers’ vantage, unfair subsidies allow recipients to maintain or increase 
their position independent of market forces. The forms of aid that may be used in privatisations to 
give advantages to producers purchasing companies include direct subsidies, recapitalisations, 
loans below market rates, writing off debts, cash contributions, and loan guarantees given by the 
member state to companies.xx From a consumers’ vantage, prices and the quality of goods are not 
necessarily optimal because aids prevent other competitors from market entry or establishing a 
strong position.  
There is a three-fold justification for analysis of developments in Spain, France and 
Ireland. The first is that while both Ireland and Spain have demonstrated higher levels of 
enthusiasm than France, all three are in favour of a deepened integration process. Because one 
would expect compliance with Community regulations, including notification of aids to Brussels, 
study of these states’ sales offers the opportunity to analyse policy-making processes and 
potential activity of firms at both levels. Secondly, although Schmidt xxi  offers insights on 
business-state relationships in France by suggesting that firms have had a significant tradition of 
using the state as a EU lobbying channel in economic policy formation, less analysis has been 
made on business-state relations in Spain and Ireland. This analysis will thus allow us to draw 
insights regarding a similar potential relationship in Spain and Ireland, while accounting for 
factors that may explain this across the three states. And thirdly, all of these states have privatised 
to different degrees since 1986, thus offering a range of sample. The French privatised first and 
more intensely, particularly in the mid 80s and early 90s; Spain privatised well before Ireland, but 
arguably less intensely than France because the state maintained until recently golden-shares in 
some monopoly sector companies; and Ireland still maintains several important public sector 
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companies whose equivalent has been partially or fully sold off in the other two states.xxii 
Analysis across the range will allow to see if there are any differences or similarities in the 
processes, particularly the strategies taken by economic actors purchasing companies.     
The next section analyses the domestic level privatisation policy-making process in 
Spain, France and Ireland, with specific focus on the aid elements of the sales. The section 
thereafter examines factors that explain the subsequent Commission decisions on the negotiated 
aids. It will be argued that although the direct participation of economic actors is crucial in 
explaining the large quantities of privatisation aid negotiated at the domestic level, their direct 
participation is absent during state aid approval at the supranational one. In order to understand 
this limited political activity of economic interests at the EU-level, attention must be focussed on 
the role of the member state as well as the paradoxes in EU policies that simultaneously guide and 
constrain the Commission. The conclusions offer insights on firms’ political activity in overlap 
issues and on the concept of the EU structural dependence on capital.  
 
The Domestic-Level - Privatisations in Spain, France and Ireland. 
The Spanish state-companies studied belonged to the former Instituto Nacional de 
Industria (INI) later renamed Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI); in France, 
those falling under the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance are analysed; and in Ireland, those 
that pertained to Department of Public Enterprise are examined. Tables 1, 2 and 3 summarize the 
main privatisations in Spain and France and all of the privatisations in Ireland over the last 15 
years; all privatisations known to receive state aids are included in the tables.xxiii  
Broad comparative analysis of the tables reveals three main observations. First, it is 
usually the case for Ireland and Spain that privatised companies receiving state aids were directly 
sold to private investors, many of which were multinationals based outside these states. The 
French model differs in that flotation was often chosen over direct sale, but the final result was the 
concentration of controlling shares to the noyaux durs as discussed in this section. Secondly, aids 
were given regardless of the ruling party.xxiv This suggests that there was no ‘government line’ in 
granting state aids, but rather, that purchasers played instrumental roles in demanding their 
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desired deal as discussed below. Thirdly, a number of state aids were indeed notified by the 
member state and subsequently reviewed by the European Commission. The exceptions were 
those between 1986 and 1993 by the Spanish Socialists (PSOE) where there was neither 
aid-notification, nor subsequent Commission review as analysed later. 
 
Spain: Economic Elites Driving the Sales at the Domestic Level 
Despite suggestions to the contrary,xxv many privatisations took place in the INI during 
Socialist rule.xxvi Previous examination of INI privatisations by the Socialists of the car maker 
Seat, which was sold to Volkswagen between 1986 and 1990, and the truck-maker Enasa, which 
was sold to the Italian firm Fiat in 1991, indicates the active participation of economic actors and 
neo-liberal minded political elites led by those from the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEH) 
seeking to stop the long-term budgetary drain posed by these companies. The result was an 
opaque policy negotiation that saw neither citizen, nor interest group, nor representative 
institutional participation.xxvii For example, in the case of Seat one witnessed a dual process of 
privatisation. This first consisted of a prior financial restructuring (saneamiento) of the public 
enterprise with Treasury funds, benefiting private financial capital from Spain. The second phase 
included granting recapitalisation funds before or after the sale, cash contributions, and 
retroactive contributions, all of which benefited the new owners. Both points highlight the active 
influence of two main actors during the privatisation process - financial capital from Spain and 
(especially) industrial capital outside of it. Another PSOE privatisation not previously examined, 
which verifies the ‘two-phase’ hypothesis, is that of MTM-Ateinsa which manufactured train 
engines and equipment.xxviii Once loans it was receiving from financial capital were repaid and the 
balance sheets cleared, the eventual price of sale to GEC-Alsthom was 3.579 billion pesetas: less 
than the share capital of the companies (4.1 billion, pesetas.) Months after the sale, the state funds 
towards the companies in terms of retroactive contributions demanded by GEC-Alsthom in 1990 
amounted to 2.676 billion pesetas.  
 SEPI privatisations by the Popular Party (PP) since 1996 also witnessed economic actors 
driving the details of the domestic level policy negotiation alongside MEH political elites. For 
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example, Productos Tubulares (hence PT), a company employing approximately 400 workers 
located in Vizcaya (the Basque Country), produced seamless steel tubes and pressurized gas 
cylinders.xxix Although its production outputs since the early 1990s steadily improved, PT’s 
before tax results still amounted to a loss of 65 million pesetas in 1997. Seeking state-withdrawal 
of this loss-making company, the government earmarked over 25 billion pesetas of Treasury 
funds to restructure the company and left a purchase price of 1 peseta as insisted by the buyer, 
Tubos Reunidos.  
 Iberia is the most recent sale by the Partido Popular also witnessing the leading role of 
economic actors during the process. The national airline had a history of low profits, high debt to 
equity ratios, and an aging fleet that justified two large capital injections of 120 billion pesetas 
and 87 billion pesetas in both 1992 and 1995, respectively.xxx Beyond improving the company’s 
financial structure and renewing the fleet, the injections paid for redundancy payments towards 
3300 of the original 30,000 workers of the early 90s. Unlike the other Spanish sales above, 
however, by 1998 the company had started to experience a turnaround after its restructuring: 
before-tax profits reached over 20 billion pesetas in 1997 and increased to over 65 billion in 
1998.xxxi In wake of the turnaround and in order to cement the company’s future growth potential, 
the PP sought to sell 40 per cent of the company to institutional investors representing both solid 
experience in the airlines sector (British Airways and American Airlines) and strong financial 
backing (Caja Madrid and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria). Newly issued shares would be in 
principle ‘purchased’ by the new partners thereby allowing the share-capital of the company to be 
increased as well. However, analysis of the negotiation process between political and economic 
actors reveals that the latter requested a direct provision of capital to help subsidize the purchase. 
The funds for this operation were provided by MEH by two means: first selling off a subsidiary of 
Iberia, Aviaco, for the value of approximately 30 billion pesetas, and later, another cash injection 
from the public purse in the amount of 20 billion pesetas. As table 4 illustrates, the price finally 
paid in December 1999 was approximately 80 per cent of the value of each investors’ shares, 
representing a total discount of 50 billion pesetas.  
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France – The Noyaux Durs and Domestic Level Sales  
Dissimilar to the Spanish privatisation in which large aid quantities were manifest, there 
were no aids given during the first major round of French privatisation under the Conservatives 
(early 1986-October 1987). The major sales of firms in competitive market positions, including 
Paribas, Societé Générale, Saint-Gobain, Havas and TF1, effectively generated FFr 100 billion 
for the Treasury.xxxii Because ‘all major decisions were left to ministerial discretion,’xxxiii the 
Finance Ministry, together with neo-liberal minded high-ranking bureaucrats heading privatised 
companies, ultimately favoured the creation of the noyaux durs. This select nucleus of French 
shareholders close to the Conservatives effectively held ‘sufficient portions of capital (and were 
able) to exercise…control.’ xxxiv  The instrument used to create this concentration was 
under-pricing: the Minister fixed share prices well below the market value, attracting large buyers 
with connections to the ruling parties. Share discounts ranged from 19 per cent for Saint Gobain 
to 8 per cent for Havas and resulted in only 24 financial and industrial actors involved in the 
distribution of the controlling blocks. This under pricing, resulting in a loss of approximately FFr 
24 billion in potential revenue, can be understood based both on the Ecole Nationale 
d’Administration (ENA)xxxv background that personally linked (political and economic) actors in 
the closed decision-making circle and on Finance’s goals to reduce state economic 
participation.xxxvi  
The second major round starting in 1993 witnessed a shift in the instruments adopted to 
privatise as handpicking of shareholders was accompanied by a number of pre-sale capital 
injections, more closely resembling the sales under the Spanish PSOE and PP.  Over FFr 80 
billion served as aid to restructure loss-making companies on the selling block as demanded by 
potential members of the noyaux durs.xxxvii For example, the computer company Bull received a 
capital injection worth FFr 4 billion between 1991 and 1992 as well as an extra FFr 2.68 billion as 
R&D assistance while still under state control. During the second round, Bull received another 
substantial injection with the goal of improving the company’s accounts prior to its sale. This aid 
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over three instalments amounted to FFr 11.1 billion between 1993 and 1994 and in large part went 
to the main buyers of the company - NEC, Motorola, Dai Nippon Printing and France Telecom – 
that had prior cooperation agreements with Bull.  
Crédit Lyonnais (CL) is perhaps the most enlightening sale witnessing a closed 
policy-process between economic investors and political actors in where large amounts of direct 
aid were given. In 1995 CL was the largest European bank with 71,000 employees and 1,700 
branches outside of France. Through various forms of payment, CL received more than FFr 100 
billion in aid over 4 years. This was deemed necessary by investors in order to save the bank while 
making it competitive as a privately owned company in which the noyaux dur was made up by 
Crédit Agricole (10 per cent), AGF (6 per cent), AXA (5.5 per cent), Commerzbank (4 per cent), 
BBV (3.7 per cent), and Banca Intesa (2.7 per cent). The privatisation of CL occurred when 
French banks were rushing to consolidate their operations through mergers and take-overs. CL, 
labelled the ‘plug-hole of a bank’, was steered by the French government towards Crédit Agricole 
just after CL’s Chief Executive brought it back to profitability thanks to massive injections.xxxviii 
Crédit Agricole was aware that it would have been chosen as main shareholder of the privatised 
CL, as its solid rural base would integrate perfectly with the urban base of CL, thus creating a 
powerful conglomerate. This was due to the Ministry of Finance’s interest in solidifying the 
banking system and seeing CL as an opportunity to create a second large conglomerate on the 
French market to balance out BNP-Paribas.xxxix The chief executive of Crédit Agricole, having 
entered an agreement with the government, acquired 10 per cent of the shares once all state aids 
had been cleared in Brussels as discussed in the next section. 
 
Ireland: The Role of the Firm in the Privatisation of Irish Steel 
 Similar to the privatisations in Spain and the second round in France, the one Irish 
privatisation in which aids were granted took place in closed settings where economic and 
high-level political actors negotiated the details of the sale. Irish Steel (hence IS) was a 100 per 
cent state owned company which operated the country’s only steel making and rolling plant out of 
Cork.xl Five years previous to its sale in 1996, IS suffered losses reaching an estimated £20 
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million by mid-1995. This was reflective of general decline in demand for steel, oversupply in the 
Community, and the collapse in prices. As a result of future difficulties, the state sought that IS be 
taken over by a private investor capable of restructuring and modernizing given changing market 
dynamics. 
 The process to find an industrial partner was hardly transparent and it is difficult to say 
with certainty from whom the state received offers and what these offers were. Nevertheless, the 
private company Ispat, a large multi-national steel making company with a good track record in 
turning around loss-making companies, was eventually chosen to negotiate with the Irish 
government led by members of the Departments of Finance and Public Enterprise. Similar to PT 
of Spain, the first condition set by the buyers included that IS would be sold for a symbolic 
amount of £1.  The second was that a £17 million loan granted to IS by the state in 1993 would be 
written off. The third was that a cash contribution of over £19 million would be made by the state 
to IS. This would be used by Ispat to cover balance sheet deficits, to implement specific remedial 
environmental works, and to restructure existing plants. And the final condition was that more 
than £2 million would be given towards any potential retroactive claims. In a similar fashion to 
the INI/SEPI sales, Ispat negotiated a sale in which it received over £38 million to take over the 
company. The only condition Ispat agreed to was its willingness to assume the company’s future 
viability over 5 years without further aid.  
  
To summarize, the domestic-level analysis indicates that several state aids were 
earmarked towards companies privatised in Spain, France (2nd round) an Ireland. This was a 
consequence of the closed process wherein economic actors actively participated with specific 
political elites to the exclusion of other social interests. Although the economic actors involved in 
the privatisations in France were representative of (largely native) investors from the Noyaux 
Durs, the Spain and Irish sales witnessed direct sales to multinationals.  
 The evidence provides an opportunity to situate these experiences first within the 
literature on business-state relationship in (domestic) economic policy formulation.  Schmidt’sxli 
hypothesis on the close ties between the French government and economic actors is verified in 
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privatisations receiving state aids. Moreover, the evidence suggests a similar dynamic at play in 
Spain and Ireland (where multinationals purchasing the companies negotiated alongside the state) 
even though such a well-established tradition does not exist in these states. An explanation for this 
may lie in the fact that these states possess strong executive leadership that was willing to make 
ties with economic actors. Elgie has argued that strong leadership in France is due to “the 
presence of a strong central state, the limitations placed on judicial review and the weakness of 
the legislature…”.xlii Heywoodxliii suggests the existence of similar factors in Spain, with the 
result being a tightly knit core-executive led by both the Prime Minister and the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. And Farrellxliv has argued that while the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) 
remains the “chief executive,” the executive “remains the arena in which ultimate…. decision 
making takes place.” The privatisation processes in all three states suggests that the 
core-executive ‘common denominator’ corresponds to the Finance Ministry that was pivotal in 
securing public funds for the operations. Such core-executives and economic actors purchasing 
these state companies had self-supporting goals that allowed ties to be established and forged. 
On the one hand (neo-liberal) political elites sought state withdrawal from companies 
suffering from a history of losses. This would serve to their goals of preventing long-term 
budgetary drain and increasing overall economic competitiveness by means of state withdrawal.  
And on the other, economic actors sought to enter new markets (or expand in pre-existing ones) 
by attaining financially restructured companies according to terms they demanded. This 
eventually would serve to their goals of attaining viable companies that were potentially 
profitably. Given the strong executive leadership from Finance willing to negotiate with 
economic actors based on both actors’ symbiotic goals, coupled with the state resources at these 
leaders’ disposal, one may argue that the economic elites acted rationally during domestic-level 
policy-making. Political participation was virtually risk free for the purchasers and pay-offs 
would have been lower had they abstained from political activity. 
 The second area of the literature we can thus situate our domestic level findings is that on 
the political activity of economic actors. One may argue that the findings are not inconsistent with 
ideas raised by ‘elite plural’ authors suggesting the importance of economic actors engaging in 
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direct domestic-level lobbying. Such a strategy taken by firms was rational, virtually risk-free, 
and in their interests to pursue because they directly benefited in negotiating aids. However, given 
the previously offered framework theorizing the existence of ‘overlap,’ wherein domestic level 
bargaining was still contingent on supranational approval, analysis of developments at the 
European Commission level is necessary. Will the uni-directional vector of influence that 
theoretically exists in overlap issues really take the firm directly to Brussels? If so, why? If not, 
why not? 
   
The European Level – The Leading Role of Economic Actors?  
Before considering the role of the EU with respect to the privatisation aids above, it is 
necessary to consider a brief ‘overview’ of how the Commission, particularly DG IV, arrives at a 
decision.xlv Drawing on ideas raised by Cini and McGowan,xlvi there are two theoretical routes. In 
the first, the Member State (MS) complies with its obligations by notifying the Commission of an 
aid. ‘Phase 1’ investigation then begins where a rapporteur (a Commission official) is given 
responsibility to lead the investigation. At the end of Phase 1, the aid can be deemed compatible 
with the Common Market or, exceptionally, a deeper Phase 2 investigation has to be started with 
initiation of the Article 93(2) procedure. The possible outcomes here can be either aid approval, 
or a negative decision, in which case the aid is deemed illegal and must be recovered by the MS.  
The second route corresponds to that where a MS does not notify the Commission of the 
aid. Here, there are two possible outcomes. In the first, the Commission becomes aware of the aid 
through some other third means (such as competitors who snitch or reports from the financial 
press) and it may order a temporary aid suspension and/or formal notification by the MS in order 
to pursue investigation of the case at the EU-level.xlvii Because European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
rulings have confirmed that “an aid cannot be deemed illegal simply because it was not 
notified,”xlviii a non-notified aid that comes to the attention of the Commission will have to go 
through Phase 1 and, potentially, Phase 2 investigation should the Commission choose to 
investigate it. The second possible outcome is that the Commission, which may be aware of the 
aid through some third party means, neither suspends and calls for formal notification, nor 
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investigates the aid’s incompatibility with the Common Market. As such, one may argue that the 
aid is effectively ‘approved,’ albeit without an official Commission decision. 
Based on the above, for the sake of simplicity there are four theoretical scenarios, where 
MS = Member State, C = Commission, T = Notification Through Third Party Means, y = aid 
notification, x = aid non-notification, ai = aid approval with investigation, awi = aid approval 
without investigation, d = aid denial, s = temporary aid suspension. 
 
i) MSy  Cai   
ii) MSy  Cd 
iii) MSx  (potentially) T

C  CforcesMS

y or Cs+forcesMS

y Cai or Cd 
iv) MSx  (potentially) T

C  Cawi 
 
The rest of this section will demonstrate that the aids given during the privatisations in 
Spain, France and Ireland are best described by scenarios (i) and (iv.) In an integrated discussion, 
we will also argue that scenarios (ii) and (iii) were not likely to be plausible alternatives. In order 
to understand why all the aids given during the sales in all three states were approved, a deeper 
analysis of the state aid decision-making process is required. Factors that may have influenced the 
Commission which are evaluated include potential MS involvement beyond simple notification, 
participation of economic actors who bought the companies, as well as the ‘structural’ constraints 
faced by supranational authorities. 
 
Scenario (i) MSy  Cai: Privatisations Under Spain’s PP, France, and Ireland 
Privatisations during PP rule in Spain, those during the second round in France, as well as 
IS in Ireland received aids that were notified by the MS to the Commission that eventually gave 
approval (see last column, Tables 1, 2, and 3). In reference to sales studied previously, after 
domestic-level agreement on terms of conditions of the Productos Tubulares sale was reached, the 
Spanish government notified the Commission of the aids earmarked towards the privatisation in 
March 1998xlix; the same was done for the aid going towards Iberia in May 1999.l This was similar 
to the Irish governments notification of aid to Irish Steel in September 1995.li Notifications were 
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given in the cases of CL (September 1996 and July 1997), Societé Marseillaise de Crédit (July 
1993) and Bull (April 1991 and February 1993).  
Although formal MS involvement is theoretically over once notification of aid takes 
place, further analysis of the Brussels decision making process surrounding the Spanish PP and 
Ireland’s IS aids reveals the MS’s key role in attempting to influence the process through national 
representatives. In the case of SEPI sales previously examined, there was subsequent 
communication between the SEPI delegation (which included members of MEH) in Brussels and 
the Commission that occurred not only through more letters, but also “bilateral contacts” between 
April and July 1998 (in the case of PT) and June and August 1999 (in the case of Iberia.) This is 
also found when analysing meetings held between officials from the Departments of Public 
Enterprise and Finance and the European Commission between September and December 1995 
(in the case of IS.) According to Commission officials, these “contacts” are commonplace when a 
state aid is investigated and they can be best characterized as “informal.”lii These meetings 
occurred not only with rapporteurs in charge of investigating a specific case, but also unit chiefs 
responsible for over-seeing aids in specific sectors. The meetings between the MS and the 
Commission served to discuss the overall ‘business plan’ of the company receiving the aid. These 
plans, previously developed by economic actors purchasing the companies, discussed details such 
as the volume of the aid, past and projected financial performance, investments to be made while 
in private hands, and workforce reductions after the sale.  Analysis of the decision making process 
in these three sales reveals two ‘bottom lines’ of the MS’s presented ‘business plan’ that the 
Commission sought. The first, corresponding to companies having a history of financial losses, 
such as PT and IS, was that they were ‘economically viable’ after the aidliii and, more importantly, 
that the state was withdrawing fully from its ownership with promises of not bailing out the 
company in the future. And for companies such as Iberia, which were on sounder financial 
footing, the bottom line judged favourably by the Commission was that the state was acting as a 
market investor who would not unreasonably inject cash into a profitable company that is in 
expansion under private ownership.  
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Though taking a tougher stance, the Commission ultimately concluded similar to the 
Spanish and Irish sales that the aids towards France’s 2nd round privatisations were compatible 
with the Common Market after numerous bilateral talks and exchange of documents with the MS 
led by representatives of Finance.  While the decisions published in the Official Journal (OJ) do 
not emphasize it, DG IV officials argued that because privatisation is considered by the 
Commission to be the “best insurance policy against future state involvement,”liv the aids to Bull 
(of FFr 18 billion) and Societe Marseillaise de Credit (FFR 6.3 billion) were let through given 
France’s emphasis of its “commitment to sale” during bilateral talks.lv The case of CL also 
highlights how France was also able to effectively side step a previous judgement by the 
Commission with promises of total state withdrawal. As DG IV officials highlight, a negative 
decision on the FFr 100 billion that was earmarked towards CL was on the pipeline, especially 
because French officials had not fulfilled their promise of ‘one time, last time’ when money was 
previously pumped into the bank to save it in 1995.lvi  However, because the business plan 
presented in late 1997 by French officials confirmed complete state retreat from CL, coupled with 
fears of the company’s closure should the aid package be denied, a positive decision on the 
(further) aid was sealed. Once the Commission’s decision to approve the aids was confirmed in 
August 1998, the procedures to privatise the bank to its main shareholder began in early 1999.  
Summarizing the evidence under this scenario, there are two main observations that can be 
integrated in the existing literature. First, the idea of ‘state economic retreat’ guided the 
Commission in the approval of aid in all three states, while it simultaneously prevented the 
Commission from making a decision against the aid. Although no part of the EEC Treaty/TEU 
stipulates that states ought to privatise, it is generally preferred by the Commission. Regardless of 
potential short-term costs, the Commission felt that states must disinvest from the economy in 
order to increase the long-term competitiveness and efficiency of the single integrated market in 
which private investors can thrive. Aware of this, the MS highlighted during these informal talks 
this key aspect of the aid serving a higher purpose – that of state economic withdrawal. Thus, 
although the Commission could have theoretically constrained member states by deciding against 
the aids as discussed earlier by authors such as Wright and Moran and Prosser, it held the view 
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that aids towards privatisations were a means to encourage economic liberalisation as discussed 
by authors such as Majone. As a result, it does not seem surprising that all the aids were approved 
and that scenario (ii) above was unlikely to occur. Interestingly, neither the region where the 
company was located, nor the sector to which the company belonged formed a large part of the 
Commission’s calculation of interests when making final decisions.  
A second observation relates to the role of the firm in the Brussels’ decision-making 
process: answering the previously raised question, the evidence in this scenario suggests that the 
uni-directional vector of influence theoretically existing in overlap issues did not take the firm the 
Brussels, at least in terms of its own direct political activity. This occurred because the MS, 
wherein strong core-executive leadership was manifest, effectively “lobbied” the Commission on 
the buyers’ behalf. Indeed, the concept of business actors’ attempting to influence Brussels’ 
policy-making through its member state has been demonstrated in the ‘elite plural’ literature by 
authors such as Coen and Wallace and Young. The arguments offered in these pieces highlight 
that the firm attempts to influence member states’ behavior in the Council of Ministers. The 
evidence gathered here also demonstrates that in specific issues the firm seeks to utilize the MS to 
directly lobby only the Commission. There are two reasons for this. 
First, in this overlap policy area the Brussels decision-making process is centred only at 
this half of the EU dual-executive and firms realized that the strong executive leadership offered 
by Spain, France and Ireland could effectively perform a one-to-one battle against the 
Commission. As discussed earlier, all three states are characterized as having strong 
core-executives and the privatisation process was a closed one in which the Ministries of Finance 
played pivotal roles. This points to the robustness of national institutions and the importance of 
business-government relations as discussed by authors such as Eberlein.lvii The supranational 
level subsequently witnessed that these domestic leaders, who had gained ties with business, 
could raise a cohesive voice during the Brussels investigation process given that national 
representation for state aid was embedded. One could thus argue that firms strategically chose 
that the MS act as an advocate in Brussels: MSs were not simply one voice amongst many in the 
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Council of Ministers, but, rather, each represented strong leadership that could effectively have, 
and was willing to perform, a face-off against the Commission on behalf of the firm. 
Secondly, economic actors sought the MS lobby not only because of its leadership strength, 
but also its legitimacy. The MS derived this legitimacy because it was ‘spending’ the money 
(giving the state aid) as opposed to ‘getting’ the money (receiving the state aid.) As one 
Commission official put it, Brussels officials avoided talking with the buyers who subsequently 
do not like to “be seen in Brussels.”lviii Firms realize that the Commission does not wish to embark 
on direct negotiations with buyers because it is “common knowledge that money put in by the 
state before privatisation is really a direct aid to buyers”lix that places them in an advantageous 
market position - something which the Commission does not want to be accused of doing. This 
points to the idea that, at times, firms will intentionally abstain from political activity: avoiding 
state aid investigators may increase the chances of having aids approved and, thus, increase 
overall benefits for the firm.  
It is important to note here that abstaining from political activity has more to do with lack of 
legitimacy than it has to do with controlling lobbying costs. As the literature on interest group 
activity suggests, several potential interests do not engage in direct lobbying in Brussels given 
resource constraints. Yet, the buyers of the companies were large capital actors with ample 
lobbying resources. Evidence of this is seen in the actions of British Airways (BA). In 1994 and 
1995 BA had (unsuccessfully) attempted to influence the Commission to stop state aids towards 
Air France and Iberia while both companies were fully state-owned.lx This leads one to conclude 
that BA had a Brussels’ lobbying infrastructure. However, in 1999 BA actually remained silent 
during the approval of aids linked to the sale of Iberia, a company of which BA was to now buy 
10%. One may argue that BA allowed the Spanish state to act on its behalf during the Iberian aid 
negotiations in 1999 precisely because Brussels considered the state a more legitimate actor in the 
aid policy process, not because BA lacked resources or a lobbying infrastructure in Brussels.      
 
Scenario (iv) MSx  (potentially) TC  Cawi: Privatisations Spain’s PSOE. 
 20
Dissimilar to the aids above that were notified by the Spanish PP, the Conservatives during 
the second round in France, and the Fine Gael-Labour coalition in Ireland, those given to 
companies privatised by the Spanish Socialists were not notified to the Commission. Given 
suspicions of existence of aid incompatible with the Common Market, DG IV requested 
information in December, 1993, from Spain’s Ministry of Industry on INI financial transactions 
since 1986 (when Spain joined the Community).lxi Within days of the request, however, the PSOE 
Industry officials stated Spain’s refusal to comply. lxii The Commission made no subsequent 
request for information and, based on interviews with Commission Officials as well as analysis of 
Competition Policy reports, to this day has neither suspended nor forced formal notification of 
aids going to INI companies privatised by the Socialists.lxiii By not subsequently investigating the 
legality of the aids, the Commission effectively approved them. One may argue that this served 
the interests of economic actors who demanded and later received the aids during domestic level 
negotiations. As in the previous scenario, the firm did not need to take the single, uni-directional 
vector to Brussels. This time it was not because the MS lobbied on its behalf, but, rather, because 
the Commission unilaterally arrived at a decision approving the aids without any other actors’ 
participation being required.    
There are three potential explanations why the Commission allowed the privatisation aids 
through.  The first relates to the staffing of the Commission. As suggested by one Commission 
official,lxiv DG IV understaffing impedes to a large extent the Commission from analysing cases 
beyond those notified, which is already greater than the Commission can handle with an average 
of over 500 cases per year.lxv Nevertheless, this explanation seems weak when considering the 
case of the Spanish Socialist privatisations: if the Commission truly lacked resources, it does not 
explain why it made the request to the INI in 1993 in the first place, or, why even something as 
simple as a follow up for more information in wake of state non-compliance to the first request 
was out of the question.  
A second explanation is that a ‘EU policy deal’lxvi was made with the Spanish Socialists: in 
exchange for the aids to ‘go through untouched,’ the Commission would receive in return Spanish 
support for other major EU policy initiatives. However, such an explanation is difficult to verify 
 21
based on analysis of potential EU policies that experienced (potential) opposition under the 
Socialists. Relying on Hix’s lxvii  framework of the 5 main areas of EU policies – namely, 
regulatory, redistributive, economic and monetary, internal security, and foreign policies – one 
can see that the Socialists had few qualms with any EU initiatives in the early-mid 90s as reflected 
in comments by Prime Minister González.lxviii The only potential contention may have related to 
changes to the structural funds (which would have provided less EU budget financing) and the 
McSharry CAP reforms (which attempted to boost competitiveness in agricultural production.)lxix 
Yet, Spanish eventual acceptance of these may be explained not because of any potential state aid 
trade-off made by the government, but, rather, because of the country’s ability to negotiate related 
preferences. That is, at the Council level Spain was able to receive increased Community 
financing by way of the Cohesion Funds established in 1994 and to maintain generous subsidies 
on Spanish products, such as olives and flax.lxx 
A third, perhaps more cogent, explanation of the Commission failure to investigate 
Socialist INI aids extends on similar reasoning explaining why notified and investigated aids go 
through. When deciding whether or not to continue to pursue investigation of the PSOE aids, the 
Commission was faced with a dilemma as suggested by several officials.lxxi  On the one hand, EU 
state aid control could be pursued guided by short-term goals of preventing unfair subsidies. And 
on the other, the aids could be allowed to pass guided by long-term larger Single Market goals 
concerned with free movement of capital in the integrated market and increasing overall market 
competitiveness, one means of which is to take the state out of the economy. Herein lies the EU 
deregulatory policy paradox with which the Commission was faced: EU deregulation stresses the 
movement towards a competitive market wherein the state plays a limited role in the capitalist 
economy and private capital can thrive, while it also allows theoretical penalization of states 
implementing means consistent with such ends if unfair state aid is granted. Aware of this 
paradox, officials realized that regardless of aids that were given by the Socialists, the overall 
privatisation policy was consistent with the general thrust of Single Market goals encouraging 
economic liberalization, increasing industrial competitiveness, and free movement of capital in 
the EU. lxxii By not having to place itself in a position where aids had to be reviewed and 
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potentially stopped (scenario iii above) the Commission did not have to either discourage states 
retreating from the economy or hinder the expansion of European capital into the single market. 
After all, key multinationals from outside Spain negotiated with the Socialists, such as Germany’s 
VW (that bought Seat), Italy’s Fiat (Enasa) and France/UK’s GEC-Alsthom (MTM-Ateinsa). The 
developments thus suggest that, guided by goals of liberalization, the Commission unilaterally 
acted in the interests of capital without its participation. As clearly emerging from interviews with 
DG IV officials, rapporteurs and higher-ranking bureaucrats do not operate in a vacuum and they 
are indeed aware of their larger economic environment: difficult decisions will be made by not 
only considering the evidence of the case, but also taking into account the wider context of 
Community economic priorities. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has considered the role of the firm in what we have defined as ‘overlap issues’ 
found in European governance. These are issues where two separate, but related, domestic and 
supranational decisions must be taken at both levels. We argued that these issues theoretically 
allow economic actors to take single, uni-directional vectors to influence public policy at both 
levels of European governance, where the vector stems from the domestic-level and extends to 
the European one. The particular overlap issue examined has been state-aids given during 
privatisations in Spain, France and Ireland and the subsequent approval of such aids at the 
supranational level.  
The evidence suggested that the uni-directional vector of influence theoretically existing 
in this overlap issue took economic actors to Madrid, Paris, and Dublin, but it did not take them 
directly to Brussels. In other words, direct participation of economic actors with core-executives 
from the Finance Ministries explain the large quantities of privatisation aid negotiated at the 
domestic-level. This can be understood based on the self-supporting goals of both economic and 
political actors. Nevertheless, the direct participation of these same economic actors did not take 
place in the aid approval process at the supranational one. The latter dynamics can be explained 
based on one of two reasons. First, in cases where the state aid was notified, the Commission 
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accepted the aid due to the influence of the Member State (MS) that ‘lobbied’ on behalf of the 
economic actors. In this scenario, economic actors purchasing the privatised companies 
intentionally abstained from political activity given that the MS consisted of executive leadership 
that was willing to lobby on behalf of the firm and because the MS had more legitimacy as policy 
actors in Brussels’ eyes. Secondly, in cases where the MS did not notify the aid, the Commission 
unilaterally accepted it without investigation and thus acted in the firms’ interest without their (or 
any advocate’s) participation being required. This can be explained not because the Commission 
either lacked resources or made a ‘policy-deal’ with member states. Rather, the Commission was 
guided and constrained by EU policy paradoxes that stressed, on the one hand, short-term state 
aid control and, on the other, long-term European market competitiveness.  
Given the above empirical findings, it is useful to extract how this study may increase our 
understanding of the political activity of economic actors in Europe. However, it is also necessary 
to highlight limitations to this study on three grounds. First, this paper deals with what we refer to 
as ‘overlap’ issues in European governance. This implied that the potential vector of influence to 
be taken by firms would be uni-directional, stemming from the domestic-level and extending to 
the European one. Where there is possibility for multi-vectors to be taken as occurs in other issue 
areas studied by those such as Coen, economic actors may face more uncertainty. This may 
subsequently affect their strategies and result in a more complex interplay between both levels of 
governance than captured in this study. Secondly, the examination has focussed on a limited area 
within EU competition policy in which there is policy overlap. From this perspective, the analysis 
is limited to lessons for privatisations and state aid decision-making, leaving future researchers to 
examine if such dynamics exist in other overlap issues such as ‘restrictive practices’ or ‘mergers.’ 
And third, we have examined developments at the domestic and EU levels focussing on only three 
of the fifteen EU states. Although many of the buyers of privatised firms were representative of 
strong capital actors, both national and supranational level dynamics may differ when the strong 
executive leadership is lacking.   
The first main insight, based on the experience when aid was notified, relates to economic 
actors’ EU lobbying strategies and why such strategies are sometimes taken. As previously noted, 
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several ‘elite plural’ authors such as Coen, and Wallace and Young have demonstrated that 
private actors have increasingly attempted to influence Brussels either through direct lobbying or 
through their member states. Indeed, the findings regarding notified state-aid are consistent with 
the idea that even though they may make no direct lobbying efforts, firms sometimes utilise the 
Member States to act as their lobbying tool in Brussels. Complementing this idea, this study has 
also demonstrated that in overlap policy issues where Brussels’ policy-making is centred around 
the Commission, firms use the MS to battle directly against the Commission: strong 
core-executive leadership which is willing to make ties with economic actors is effectively 
utilised to perform a face-off. The reason why this strategy is taken is not only because the MS 
offers solid leadership, but also because Brussels sometimes may not consider the firm to be a 
desirable policy actor. Ignoring this lack of legitimacy and pursuing direct lobbying would have 
meant that private actors would have risked losing outcomes previously secured during (risk free) 
domestic level bargaining. Because political activity in Brussels meant that end-payoffs would be 
potentially smaller than with non-activity, it seemed a reasonable strategy for economic actors to 
remain silent, if not hidden, in order to achieve their desired choices. This suggests that at times 
economic actors will not seek a privileged EU policy-making position. Rather, they sometimes 
may have strategic reasons for intentionally abstaining from direct political action in Brussels, 
even though the outcomes of this level’s policy-making process may have a direct impact on 
them.  
The second insight drawn from this study, based on the findings when aid was not 
notified, helps scholars reflect on assumptions underlying many of the studies of EU interest 
group behaviour from the pluralist/corporatist/elitist perspectives as mentioned in the beginning 
of the paper. Such studies assume that there is observable conflict in the policy-making process 
and that direct participation, or through an intermediary, is necessary for private actors in order to 
attain outcomes in their interest. However, this paper has presented some evidence suggesting that 
observable conflict does not occur even though final outcomes in economic actors’ interest are 
achieved. As discussed above, state aid developments under the Spanish Socialists witnessed the 
Commission unilaterally deciding in favour of unnotified aids by not pursuing investigation. It 
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was argued that the Commission chose long-term goals of creating a competitive European 
economy (characterized by free movement of capital and state-economic retreat) over short-term 
infringements of Community regulations (on state aid control.) In such a scenario, policy 
preferences of capital actors were thus heard without having to raise voices. With this in mind, it 
is relevant to note what Przeworski and Wallerstein argue: 
 
The effective capacity of any government to attain whatever are its 
goals is circumscribed by the public power of capital…. It does not 
matter who the state managers are, what they want, and whom the 
represent…. Capitalists do not even have to organize and act 
collectively: it suffices that they blindly pursue narrow, self-interest 
to sharply restrict the options of all governments.lxxiii 
  
Even though economic actors may not directly participate in the EU policy-making 
process, or even have any type of representation acting on their behalf, there are times that EU 
public policy may still be biased in favour of their interests given the capitalist economy within 
which the political system functions. The actions of EU officials will be at times “relatively 
autonomous” – decisions may be taken unilaterally, but they will be structurally bound within the 
capitalist economic framework. With this in mind, EU scholars may reconsider taking the trodden 
path leading to further analyses of key actors in the (formal or informal) Brussels’ policy process. 
Rather, they may envisage taking a less travelled one leading to further analyses of how 
sometimes supranational actors will act relatively autonomous in the interests of economic actors 
and how EU public policy may be structurally dependent on capital.  
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Table 1 – Main privatisations in the Spanish INI/SEPI 1986-2000 
 
Year Company  Sector Buyers State Aid Given 
During Sale 
(Pesetas)? 
State 
Notification/ 
Commission 
Review of 
Aid 
1986 Seat Automobiles Volkswagen A.G Yes – 34.0 billion  No 
1986 Fovisa Steel Grupo GKN Yes – 2.08 billion No 
1987 Purolater 
Ibérica 
Car Parts Knecht 
Filterwerke 
Yes – 319.6 million  No 
1987 Acesa Construction Flotation No N/A 
1988 Endesa Electricity Flotation No N/A 
1989 Astican Naval 
Construction 
Italmar Yes – 763 million  No 
1989 MTM-Atei
nsa 
Transport 
Equipment 
GEC Alsthom Yes – 20.88 billion No 
1989 Enfersa Fertilizers Ercros Yes – 6.96 billion  No 
1989 Pesa Electronics Amper, S.A. Yes – 1.75 billion No 
1991-
1993 
ENASA Truck 
Makers 
Fiat Yes – 28 billion No 
1996 Sefanitro Aluminum Fertiberia No N/A 
1997 Almagrera Mining Navan Resources Yes - 6.72 billion  Yes 
1997 Auxini Construction OCP No N/A 
1998 Productos 
Tubulares 
Steel Tubes Tubos Reunidos Yes - 25.02 billion  Yes  
1998  Enagas Natural Gas Gas Natural No N/A 
1998 Inespal Aluminum Alcoa Yes ~ Amount 
Unknown 
Yes 
1999 Astander Shipbuilding Italmar No N/A 
1999 G. Enatcar Transport 
Veh. 
Alianza Bus No N/A 
1999 Iberia Airlines 7 Institutional 
Partners (see text)  
Yes – 20 billion Yes 
 
Sources: INI/SEPI Annual Reports, 1985-2000, Dinero, (29 de enero, 1996); Cinco Dias,  (29 de 
septiembre 1995), author analysis of INI/SEPI Internal Documents (for privatisations between 1986 and 
1993); Official Journal (OJ), No. C245/7, 12/8/97 (Almagrera); OJ, C09/6, 30/12/98 (Productos 
Tubulares); and OJ 211/16, 7/7/98 (Inespal) 
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Table 2 – Main privatisations in France 
 
 
Year Company  Sector Buyers State Aid Given 
During Sale 
(FFr)? 
State 
Notification/ 
Commission 
Review of Aid 
      
1987 Societé 
Général 
Banking Flotation No N/A 
1987 Havas Telecom Flotation No N/A 
1987 TF1 Television Flotation No N/A 
1987 Saint 
Gobain 
Manufacturing Flotation No N/A 
1987 Sogenal Insurance Flotation No N/A 
1987 Groupe 
Paribas 
Banking Flotation N/A N/A 
1993 Bull Electronics  Yes –16 billion Yes 
1997 GAN Insurance  Flotation Yes –23.6 billion Yes 
1998 SMC Banking Banque 
Chaix 
Yes –6.3 billion Yes 
1999 Thomson Electronics Flotation Yes - 11 billion Yes 
1999 Crédit 
Lyonnais 
Banking Flotation Yes - 100 billion Yes 
 
 
Sources: Competition Policy Newsletter, No. 3, October 2000; OJ, No. C.90/3, 1997 (Thomson); 
OJ L 067, 7/3/1998 (Thomson); OJ C202/6, 1991 (Bull); OJC244/2, 1992 (Bull); OJ C346/3, 
1993 (Bull); OJ C80/4, 1994 (Bull); OJ L386/1, 12/10/1994 (Bull); OJ L198, 30/7/1998 (SMC); 
OJ C149/5, 12/3/1997 (GAN); OJ L308, 21/12/1995 (Credit Lyonnais); OJ C390, 24/12/1996 
(Credit Lyonnais); OJ L 221, 8/8/1998 (Credit Lyonnais) 
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Table 3 – Main privatisations in Ireland 
 
Year Company  Sector Buyers State Aid Given 
During Sale 
(IRP)? 
State 
Notification/
Commission 
Review of 
Aid 
1990 Irish Life Insurance Flotation No N/A 
1990 Irish Sugar 
Company 
Sugar 
Production 
Flotation No N/A 
1991 B&I 
Shipping 
Co. 
Marine 
Transport 
Irish Ferries No N/A 
1996 Irish Steel Steel 
Production 
Ispat Yes-38.30 million Yes 
1996-19
99 
Telecom 
Eirann 
Telecom KPN, Telia, 
and 
Flotation 
No N/A 
 
Source: Author(s) own research and OJ No. L121, 1996/05/21. 
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Table 4 – Iberia Sale 
 
Partner % Sold  Value (Million of Pesetas) Price Paid Difference 
     
BA 9 52200 40950 -11250 
American 1 5800 4550 -1250 
Caja Madrid 10 58000 45500 -12500 
BBVA 7,3 42340 33215 -9125 
Logista 6,7 38860 30485 -8375 
El Corte Ingles 3 17400 13650 -3750 
Ahorro Corp. 3 17400 13650 -3750 
     
Total 40 232000 182000 -50000 
 
Source: El Pais 3/10/99, El Pais, 19/10/99, El Pais, 8/04/2001. 
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